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Seeking Protection from the Law?
Exploring Changing Arguments for U.S. Domestic
Violence Asylum Claims and Gendered Resistance
by Courts
By
Richael Faithful*

I. Introduction
In July 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) argued in a supplemental Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) brief that under certain circumstances, female
domestic violence (“DV”) survivors may have a cognizable asylum claim in the United States.1 The DHS brief breaks nine years
of executive level silence on the issue,2 as the Obama administration ignites advocates’ imaginations about the future of domestic,
gender-based asylum.
The administration’s new position is significant on two
levels. First, domestic violence has become the miner’s canary
issue for gender-based asylum. Gender-based claims occupy an
ambivalent area in United States asylum law but in recent years,
female genitalia mutilation (“FGM”), also known as female circumcision,3 has been the basis under which women bring successful asylum claims.4 The BIA’s treatment of the DHS brief has
the potential to clarify the gender question, marking its relevance
and meaning in asylum law today.
Second, the BIA’s response is a potential turning point
for women’s issues within international law. The United States,
like many other countries, is conflicted on the gender question
because it is still influenced by historical tensions between malecentered norms and modern challenges to them. Domestic violence, as a quintessential women’s issue on one hand, exposes
the human rights law evolution that is beginning to fully embrace
violence against women as an issue, and on the other hand,
exposes its shortcomings as an area that still fails to adequately
protect women from gendered persecution. Thus, a successful
effort to recognize DV claims may align emerging values with
ancient practices to further legitimize women’s issues within
human rights law.
This essay intends to offer context to the executive
branch’s new position, and to evaluate proposed ideas in order
to better establish gender-based asylum claims. Part One of this
essay briefly provides a background for the development of international human rights law related to women’s issues. Part Two
observes the ways in which embedded male bias within United
States common law creates persistent barriers for domestic violence claims. Part Three evaluates the executive’s position and
alternative proposals for reform under governing law. Finally,
Part Four concludes by arguing that at this stage, devising comprehensive strategies for systemic reform is the most important
contribution that human rights scholars can make to strengthen
future DV and other gender-based claims.
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II. Freedom from Gendered Violence as a
Human Right
Women’s citizenship within international human rights
law is a new phenomenon. International human rights law is
the culmination of evolved shared values and aspirations by the
world community that “corresponds only partially to the historical reality: the rights of women and of non-white persons, in fact,
arose relatively late in history.”5 This area of law is humanizing
its treatment toward women to meet a “standard of citizenship,”6
as conditions surrounding women are increasingly recognized
as inhumane. More recently, feminism and human rights have
formed a rich dialectical relationship. This relationship relies on
each field’s strengths to fill in theoretical gaps to develop more
inclusive and relief-driven principles.7 The result is tangible
improvements in legal citizenship for some poor women, women
of color, and women living in the global south.
Refugee law must be viewed within this broader international human rights history and legal framework. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the basis of international human
rights, is often criticized for excluding social and economic
rights, such as the right to work, right to control one’s possessions, and the right to be free from violence. Women are disproportionately impacted by these fatal exclusions,8 but a multitude
of conventions and agreements now expressly recognize women’s
legal citizenship. The most notable international commitment is
the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”).9
CEDAW is generally hailed as a pivotal international law
effort to enfranchise women. One Latina feminist scholar claims
that CEDAW “takes a holistic approach towards women from all
walks of life attaining full personhood by recognizing the importance not only of civil and political rights but also of social, economic, cultural and solidarity rights.”10 She further argues that
“[t]his treaty, along with other gender specific documents and
perspectives recently embraced by the global community as well
as the recognition of the need for gender perspectives in general
documents (such as the International Criminal Court statute), are
(can be) the foundation for making women’s equality an accessible reality.”11 Other feminist scholars, however, criticize what
they view as CEDAW’s practical futility with the consideration
that “rights only exist to the extent states recognize and enforce
them.”12 The area of asylum law uniquely feels the absence of
accountability mechanisms to enforce CEDAW.
United States asylum law is based on the Immigration
and Nationality Act revision after adoption of the 1951 United
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Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refu- asylum describes its legal framework as heavily reliant on malegees Convention”) and the corresponding 1967 United Nations centered experiences.25 Specifically, many of these critiques
protocol.13 Gender is not an enumerated asylum ground under appropriately point out that certain persecution-defined harms,
the Refugees Convention, which includes race, religion, nation- such as domestic violence, are often regarded as “private” issues
ality, political opinion or a “particular social group.”14 In 1991, that are unworthy of foreign intervention.26 Beyond this specific
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu- observation, male bias also appears within the common law tests
gees (“UNHCR”) attempted to address this omission by issuing for defining persecution. These tests premise “rational” presumpGuidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women that explained tions about violence on a limited set of realities faced by a minor“women refugees who are persecuted on account of their oppo- ity of applicants. For this reason DV is an exceedingly difficult
sition to social traditions need protection and therefore should claim to prove within the governing law.
qualify as members of a [particular social group].”15 Several
It is worth noting that gender violence is not synonycountries, including the United States, issued their own guide- mous with violence against women. Historically, among feminist
lines to further clarify the role of gender in refugee cases.
writers, domestic violence had been conceptualized as spousal
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) or heterosexual partner violence.27 Contemporary feminist writissued Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum ers and advocates prefer the term, “intimate-partner violence,”
Claims from Women (“INS Guidelines”) in 1995.16 Domestic to capture abuse within non-legally recognized relationships
advocates heralded the INS Guidelines as a “significant step for- (such as relationships between non-married people or between
ward for women in asylum law[.]”17 In terms of DV claims, the lesbian, gay, or transgender-identified individuals).28 Others preINS Guidelines are helpful because they affirm that “private” fer “gender-based violence” to broaden this perspective even
persecution in which the government is unwilling or unable to more because gender non-conformity (sometimes perceived as
intervene is a cognizable asylum claim.18 At the same time, how- homosexuality) and other gender-related human rights abuses
ever, the INS Guidelines failed to establish domestic violence occur outside the law’s current scope.29 This discussion is framed
itself as a form of persecution and instead regarded it merely as within the context of domestic violence for analytical purposes.30
evidence of past persecution.19 Most importantly, the INS Guide- Generally speaking, relationship violence, regardless of form,
lines do not assume the force of law. 20 This essential issue will remains on the outskirts of the law because male-centered perbe discussed more in the final section.
spectives continue to dominate asylum law.31
Efforts by international law-making bodies to establish
It is also important to understand DV as a social, politiviolence against women as a cognizable asylum claim within cal, and moral pandemic. The international statistics are staggerits member-states clearly fall short. The United States (“U.S.”) ing. One-quarter to one-half of all women are abused by intimate
rarely grants asylum for gender-based violence against women, partners, and 40 to 70% of all female murder victims are killed
even though 80% of the world’s 27 million
by intimate partners.32 Sadly, U.S. statisrefugees are women and children.21 The
tics reflect similar trends. A 1995-1996
legal authority around domestic violence is Simply put, U.S. immigration survey found that nearly 25% of women,
clear, yet “its operation still depends on the courts and executive officers and 7.6% of men, were raped or physipolitical will of those who interpret it.”22
cally assaulted by an intimate partner in
lack the political will to
Simply put, U.S. immigration courts and
their lifetime.33 Intimate partner violence
enforce the law.
executive officers lack the political will to
constituted 20% of all non-fatal violence
enforce the law.
against women in 2001, and 3% of all nonfatal violence toward men.34 Almost half
of all 3.5 million crimes committed against
III. Reading Between the Lines: Critical Gender family members were spousal abuse between 1998 and 2002.35
Perspective in Asylum Common Law and
DV exhibits a pattern of violence and oppression that is inherent
Precedent Cases
in any reasonable notion of persecution. The international community’s impression of persecution in the 1950’s, however, does
Feminist legal scholars have long-argued that DV survi- not reflect our modern realities, and those seeking to expand the
vors deserve asylum protection as a “particular social group”23 definition of DV have faced a decades-long legal challenge that
(“PSG”). These analyses generate explanatory force behind argu- has proven more difficult than ever imagined.
ments that violence against women is tolerated within asylum
Domestic violence does not fit neatly into the current
law throughout the world.24 Interestingly, however, even though refugee legal regime. In order to be eligible for a discretionary
gendered violence remains a rare basis on which to grant asylum, grant of relief, a petitioner must show a well-founded fear of pertwo new trends have emerged. First, DV claims tied to religious secution based on a protected status and must meet three criteria:
or political persecution are increasingly successful. Second, 1) the pervasiveness of the act in the individual’s home country;
“uncivilized” violence against women, specifically FGM, is gain- 2) a lack of existing refuge within the individual’s home country;
ing favor within courts as a basis for asylum. I argue that these and 3) the government’s unwillingness or inability to intervene.
two patterns do not reflect significant improvement in attitudes Two requirements specifically pose challenges for domestic viotoward female survivors; rather, these patterns reveal systemic lence claims: proving persecution (clear probability that one’s
male bias within the asylum legal framework in its common law life or freedom is threatened)36 and demonstrating that such
and interpretative rationale.
persecution is attributed to a statutorily protected status, such as
Scholars address male bias within asylum law in both race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or a PSG.37 Many
a general and a specific context. Generally, scholarship on DV DV petitioners argue that they will suffer persecution based on
Fall 2009
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their membership in a PSG or based on their political opinion is that this test presents a pernicious epistemological dilemma
against women and girl violence. 38
when considered with the non-PSG standards. As noted before,
Ironically, without gender as an enumerated ground, there are three criteria for the persecution threshold, including a
PSG DV claims are not viable at all because “defining what con- “pervasive” standard and “inability to escape” standard. DV surstitutes such a group for purposes of the INA remains elusive vivors who may experience “private” violence that is nonetheless
and inconsistent.” 39 The PSG category is sometimes referred to pervasive, normalized, or honored, face a disadvantage to prove
as a Refugee Convention drafting “afterthat their persecution is visible when it is
thought,”40 only added on a whim by a
systemically ignored, rationalized, or ritualDV survivors who may
single delegation wishing to have a miscelized. Thus, the “substantial evidence” bar49
lany category. One scholar described the experience “private” violence is heightened for DV survivors who must
Refugee Convention’s provisions, which
that DV has a high occurrence rate
that is nonetheless pervasive, show
he believes mirrors post-World War II era
and is visible in their home country. Such a
politics, as “frozen in time.”41 U.S. immi- normalized, or honored, face proposition is counter-intuitive because any
gration judges and the United Nations have a disadvantage to prove that “rational” state government would address
construed this category to mean selective
known harms against its citizens,
their persecution is visible widely
persecution, 42 meaning that a PSG cannot
but this presumption is inaccurate when
be significantly defined by its past or future when it is systemically ignored, applied to DV and other gendered violence.
persecution. For instance, the Sixth Circuit
rationalized, or ritualized. The internal tensions built into the visibilCourt found that young, attractive Albanian
ity test and other standards starkly contrast
women who fear being forced into prostiwith the realities of violence faced by a
tution are not a PSG because they constitute a self-defined or large number of women. Further, this dilemma demonstrates a
“impermissibly circular” (IC) group.43 DV claims are arguably narrow common law construction that favors male-experienced
most vulnerable on this point because “domestic violence survi- persecution.
vors” are interpreted as an “impermissibly circular” social group
The final PSG test is “particularity” which requires a
that is defined by its membership. The IC application discussed social group to be discerned “in a manner sufficiently distinct
in the next section will address how the three PSG tests pose dis- that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as
tinct barriers for DV claims.
a discrete class of persons.”50 The “particularity” test is intended
to create a benchmark for objectively determining group membership.51 Yet its interpretation, like the visibility test, reveals
Male Bias Embedded within Legal Tests
implicit male bias. An opinion from the Third Circuit, Fatin v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service,52 characterizes this bias,
There are three PSG tests: immutability, visibility, and stating:
particularity. Each test contains subtle, insidious male-bias in
its common law construction that leads to an unnecessarily nar“Limited in this way, the ‘particular social
row interpretation. The outcome is that legitimate DV claims are
group’ identified by the petitioner may well satrejected almost per se because PSG tests are construed narrowly
isfy the BIA’s definition of that concept, for if a
and heighten the burden of proof for petitioners.
woman’s opposition to the Iranian laws in quesThe first test is the Acosta standard, which establishes
tion is so profound that she would choose to
that a social group must share a common, immutable “ characsuffer the severe consequences of noncompliteristic that either is beyond the power of the individual members
ance, her beliefs may well be characterized as
of the group to change or is so fundamental to their identities
‘so fundamental to [her] identity or conscience
or consciences that it ought not be required to be changed.”44
that [they] ought not be required to be changed’
Some courts have slightly expanded this definition to include
(internal citation omitted). The petitioner’s
an innate characteristic or shared past experience.45 The Acosta
difficulty, however, is that the administrative
standard is favorable to DV claims. For example, a female DV
record does not establish that she is a member
survivor who suffers persecution at the hands of a male lover
of this tightly defined group, for there is no eviwho hurts her because of his belief that women are subordinate
dence in that record showing that her opposito men, and because he has the physical ability to do so, may eastion to the Iranian laws at issue is of the depth
ily meet the Acosta standard on account of her identity as female
and importance required.”53
or her history of abuse.46 Overall, the flexibility around the
Acosta standard accommodates DV claims. It is the other two
The Circuit Court rejected Fatin’s petition despite ample
requirements—visibility and particularity—that are the most dif- evidence that she was doubly at risk as a female member of a
ficult to meet.
politically targeted family in Iran.54 Moreover, the Court relied
Social visibility is the second PSG test. This test is par- on an admittedly sparse record to conclude that a reasonable
ticularly context-dependent47 since petitioners must provide evi- fact-finder could not find that the petitioner would face a threat
dence that they are at greater risk due to their membership in an amounting to persecution “simply” because she is a woman.55
identifiable PSG.48 This test clearly excludes less visible forms The opinion ignored her family’s political status when relevant,
of persecution like DV or rape. Other scholars have examined and her status as a politically-vulnerable woman when important
the exclusion of privatized violence in detail, and this will be to determine that she was at risk for neither reason. This case
addressed briefly later in the essay. More significant, however, demonstrates that the visibility and particularly tests interlock to
20

The Modern American

reinforce male bias by privileging male-experienced persecution Judges choose to find sympathetic exceptions among cases rather
over other types of meritorious persecution.
than choosing to embrace gender-based persecution into the law.
The three “particular social group” tests create numerous This approach inevitably undermines future domestic violence
barriers for proving persecution outside traditional male norms. claims. There are three primary areas of analysis ripe for inconPerhaps worse than rejecting legitimate
sistent, biased discretion, which are approDV claims vis-à-vis PSG tests, the courts
priate to call “opportunistic rationality”:
courts inconsistently apply private/public persecution, state/non-govhave adopted the facially-neutral rule of
“impermissibly circular,” which adversely the rule based on culturally- ernmental actors, and violent experiences.
impacts gender-based claims. Worse still,
rationality reinforces that
loaded, paternalistic beliefs Opportunistic
courts inconsistently apply the rule based
“reason” goes as far as the logician in genon culturally-loaded, paternalistic beliefs about “deserving exceptions. der-based asylum cases.
about “deserving exceptions.”
The first area of analysis is the
distinction between “private” and “public”
persecution. Domestic violence is essenThe “Impermissibly Circular” Argument and Its tially a misnomer as violence against partners takes place in both
Opportunistic Rationality
private and public view. Its description relates more to an antiquated conception of the relationship between perpetrator and
The “impermissibly circular” (“IC”) rule derives from survivor. Nevertheless, “[t]raditional human rights law (and virthe rationale that a PSG must exist independently of the perse- tually all other discourses except feminism) has separated out
cution suffered by the applicant for asylum.56 In other words, a acts that occur in the public sector from those that transpire in
PSG must exist before the alleged persecution to avoid defining a the private sphere.”67 As a result, courts have rejected otherwise
group within its own “contours.”57 Past persecution, under some legitimate asylum claims on the basis that there is no justificacircumstances, may demonstrate a well-founded fear of future tion for state intervention. Over time, “private act” justifications
persecution; it cannot, however, constitute the substantive claim have become less accepted, but remarkably it continues to have
for protection.58 In some cases, previously discussed PSG tests a menacing presence in U.S. asylum domestic violence claims,
are interwoven together to form an IC analysis. For instance, exemplified by a feminist BIA favorite: The Matter of R-A-.
at-risk youth within a certain country are unlikely to meet the
The Matter of R-A-68 is an archetypal example of the
persecution threshold because their membership is based on a enduring belief that domestic violence is essentially a private
self-defining, mutable characteristic—age.59 IC, therefore, refers matter. In this case, Rodi Alvardo, a native Guatemalan, sought
to the ways by which a PSG is narrowed in the common law to refugee status after suffering years of violent physical, sexual,
necessarily exclude claims.60 Otherwise, supporters fear that the and emotional abuse from her husband, which included: her dislaw would “sanction an illogical, circular ‘nexus’ construct, i.e., located jaw for a late period, spinal injuries from a kicking attack
individuals are targeted for persecution because they belong to after refusing an abortion and near physical disability when a
a group of individuals who are targeted for persecution.”61 This thrown machete barely missed her fingers.69 Alvardo demonfear seems to contradict the fundamental purposes for asylum to strated that domestic violence in Guatemala remains prevalent70
provide refuge to individuals who are persecuted for particularly and that few if any legal organizations could have helped her.71
inequitable reasons.
She was successful in the lower immigration court in arguing that
Many gender-based claims, especially DV claims, are her political opinion, opposing male domination, culminated in
dismissed for being “impermissibly circular.”62 U.S. courts con- her well-founded fear of persecution, with which the BIA parsistently apply the IC rule, despite international consensus urg- tially agreed.72 The BIA ruled that the case turned on whether
ing judges to include women as a PSG when appropriate.63 Not Alvardo’s husband had knowledge of her views and abused her
only is it peculiar that federal courts apply a non-discrimination but for her views.73 In its determination, the BIA refused to apply
human rights treaty to exclude legitimate claims by women,64 but the imputed political doctrine,74 a device that allows the court
it is even more unsettling when the U.S. is one of the four coun- to affirmatively impute a political opinion through evidentiary
tries (out of 41) with a domestic policy that recognizes “women” inferences, such as acts of resistance.75 The imputed political
as a PSG.65 If arguably U.S. courts have become more gender- doctrine is recommended by the INS Guidelines for cases such
sensitive in response to the 1995 INS Guidelines, courts still as this one. Instead, almost in defiance, the BIA dismissed INS
embrace IC derivatives to deny DV claims, and to say that bat- Guidelines as “not controlling on us”76 and found that “it is diffitered women are too large of a social group
cult to conclude on the actual record before
for the purposes of statutory construction.66
us that there is any ‘opinion’ the respondent
It appears that the classic could have held, or convinced her husband
Recent cases continue to show a reluctance
to recognize freedom from gendered vio“worthy refugee” dilemma she held, that would have prevented the
77
lence as a civil or political human right.
is only further strained with abuse she experienced.”
While there are indications that
The BIA’s opinion in The Matgender, race, and cultural ter of R-A- rendered the petitioner’s belief
gender-based claims are receiving more
serious treatment, adjudicators continue
complexities.
that she deserves to live free from domesto perpetuate male bias and, in certain
tic violence as an apolitical viewpoint. In
instances, substitute cultural bias for genother words, although governing law does
der bias. It appears that the classic “worthy refugee” dilemma is not require political opinions to be articulated in a certain way
only further strained with gender, race, and cultural complexities. or venue,78 the court was unwilling to recognize her claim as
Fall 2009
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worthy of intervention because it was not an effective opinion. claim against her black persecutors.83 The problem with characThe de-politicization of Alvardo’s views reinforces the belief that terizing FGM cases as exceptionally violent is that it obscures
domestic violence is not a public matter—it is simply another urgency around violent experiences, such as domestic violence,
unfortunate private situation over which the state has no power.
that are more familiar to U.S. judges. “Uncivilized” violence
The second area of analysis relates to non-state per- against women and girls “over there” does not force courts to
secutors. DV claims reveal the historic reluctance of judges to confront gender-based violence as a widespread, complex pheview non-governmental actors as potential
nomenon. In actuality, it exacerbates culpersecutors in the “safe haven” standard
tural and racial stereotypes in a way that
(among the three persecution criteria). “Uncivilized” violence against isolates and distances them from the issue.
Opponents to broadening the standard women and girls “over there” Inconsistent application of the law creates
maintain a misguided belief that “construthe potential for a racialized, tiered system
does not force courts to
ing private acts of violence to be qualifyby which violence is evaluated in the asyconfront gender-based
ing governmental persecution, by virtue
lum law in a way that ultimately does not
of inadequacy of protection, would obviserve human rights law.
violence as a widespread,
ate, perhaps entirely, the ‘on account of ’
Opportunistic
rationality
is
complex phenomenon.
requirement of the statute.”79 This is a slipdefined by false notions about the nature
of violence, and it is reinforced by legal
pery-slope argument that posits that updatrationalizations about distinctions among
ing the standard to reflect present-day
realities will somehow validate any asylum claim. On the con- these false notions. In addition to the PSG test interpretations,
trary, broadening the standard does not wash away state sover- male bias plays a more subtle role in decision-making through
eignty; instead, it more accurately captures the complex violence arbitrary application that is ironically justified by North Ameripatterns that we see today. There is a real distinction between can feminist paradigms.
inadequate state protection and unwillingness from the state to
protect a class. Fortunately, the current U.S. jurisprudential trend
IV. New Formulations, New Prospects?
is to acknowledge negative governmental action as rising to the
standard. It remains to be seen whether this trend will widely
The DHS supplemental brief submitted to the BIA
apply to gender-based cases, in which petitioners usually do not
have any practical protection at home. Equally worrisome, the on behalf of a domestic violence asylum-seeker seems to be a
modern “safe haven” standard is subject to high levels of discre- positive outcome for gender-based asylum cases. The brief prestion without codification. One example is Canada, which treats ents “alternative particular social group formulations” to the
its gender guidelines more seriously, arguing that pain and suf- respondent’s claim: “Mexican women in an abusive domestic
84
fering may result from willful government acquiescence.80 The relationship who are unable to leave.” DHS concedes that the
future of the modern “safe haven” standard will appreciably respondent’s argument fails under governing legal principles
because the “central common characteristic” is circular.85 In
depend on the outcomes of current DV cases.
addition to the alternative formulations, the
The final “opportunistic ratiobrief proposes that if either of its formunality” area of analysis is seen in violent
Opportunistic rationality
lations meets the criteria for a cognizable
experiences for which courts have creis defined by false notions claim, then remand is an appropriate mechated exceptions. Over the last decade, only
one area of gender-based asylum claims about the nature of violence, anism to consider where “significant legal
developments intervene.”86 The last caveat
has seen almost universal success: FGM
and
it
is
reinforced
by
legal
outlined by the brief is that some, but not
cases.81 These cases typify the “worthy refrationalizations about
all, domestic violence survivors are eligible
ugee” dilemma where adjudicators choose
for asylum. However, like any other asylum
to recognize the brutality of gender-related
distinctions among these
claim, every applicable requirement must
violence in one context while choosing to
false notions.
be satisfied for asylum to be granted.87
rationalize it in another. Half of the federal
There are discernable signs of
circuit courts and the BIA have found FGM
broader advocacy in the brief. In its genas an act of persecution rising to the level of
asylum protection during the last several years. Successful FGM eral requirement discussion, the brief stated that the applicant
cases will expose domestic violence claims to increased biased may satisfy the safe haven standard by showing that government
acquiescence is contributing to the respondent’s persecution.88
scrutiny at best.
FGM is not qualitatively distinct from DV but cultural This position reinforces the authority of the INS Guidelines
bigotry and racism color the issues differently in some judges’ despite higher courts’ attempts to dismiss their importance.
eyes. Courts’ treatment of domestic violence in relation to FGM Moreover, before laying out the formulations, the brief opined
exposes Western feminists’ failure to incorporate strong racial and “especially given the uneven development of the standards govcultural analysis into its advocacy surrounding the issue. Promi- erning cases like this one, it is important to articulate how a social
89
nent issue scholar Pamela Goldberg’s three-case comparison in group in such cases might be defined.” Both of these statements
the Second Circuit found race to be a key distinction among the are restrained, yet are striking examples that likely foreshadow
gender-based asylum claims that she studied.82 Notably, in one the new administration’s more liberal treatment of gender-based
case she describes that a black petitioner’s “exotic ‘otherness’” asylum cases.
did not reflect negatively against her as much as it supported her
22
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DHS articulates its formulations as “Mexican women political one. Many immigration judges may have a good faith
in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” or “Mexican belief that DV survivors simply do not meet the existing statuwomen who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions tory requirements. However, it is clear that there are systemic
within a domestic relationship.”90 DHS argues that a PSG claim impediments that influence the confines within which judges are
is “best defined in light of the evidence about how the respon- able to interpret important legal considerations like statutory
dent’s abuser and her society perceive her role within the domes- intent, case-specific facts, and policy issues. There is not much
tic relationship.”91 The brief goes on to detail the evidence on optimism for the successful outcome of the DV survivor in this
record that supports the formulation, including her testimony that particular case, considering the case law trend against DV claims
her husband “used to tell her that he could do anything he wanted and the absence of any significant changes to PSG construction,
to her because she belonged to him,” and it suggests that further but there is optimism that the DHS brief will create opportunities
fact-finding may substantiate that “social expectations in Mexico for institutional change on a case-advocacy level.
do little to disabuse [him] of his views in this regard.”92 These
Ultimately, institutional change is the best assurance
formulations, DHS argues, satisfy the immutability, visibility, that DV claims will be fairly adjudicated. There are a variety of
and particularity requirements, in which “complex and subtle” ways to affect institutional change, even through notoriously confact-finding may be required, and existing statutory definitions servative institutions, such as immigration courts. Attorneys who
may be evoked, to reasonably interpret the claims.93
challenge prevailing norms and assumptions in asylum advocacy
Interestingly, the DHS formulations are identical to play an important role. Theorists, especially feminist scholars,
some feminist scholars’ proposals over the last decade to trans- have fulfilled a vital need by forming the basis by which some
form DV into a cognizable asylum. The primary, though not advocates have advanced alternative frames. Policy advocates
exclusive, project by feminists during this time has been to find (many of whom fall into the latter categories as well) also target
ways to narrow domestic violence claims so that they better fit the underpinnings that limit future progress for DV claims. Each
into the three PSG factor tests. Feminists’ proposals can be gen- approach, in its persistence and originality, promises that gendererally categorized into three groups: 1) traditional approach: re- based asylum claims, in time, will be treated more seriously by
formulating arguments to fit within existing legal interpretations; courts.
2) feminist approach: arguing that existing interpretations are
inaccurate or biased against legitimate claims, thus urging new
V. Conclusion
rule construction and 3) reform approach: advocating for international and domestic statutory revisions to more clearly include
I suggest that scholars concerned about gender-based
“gender” into refugee law. DHS adopted a traditional approach
that attempts to narrow the “domestic violence survivor” class asylum may want to shift their focus from re-thinking legitimate
by combining several elements: geography, political opinion, and arguments about why gendered violence is deserving of asylum
protection, to discussing systemic changes that can more directly
case-specific facts.
The DHS formulations will test scholars’ proposals that affect decision-making. I believe in particular that strengthening
were argued to meet judicial scrutiny when initially proposed— the INS Guidelines can prove to be enormously beneficial. At
all other factors remaining consistent. One proposal, written by least one persuasive feminist scholar credits the INS Guidelines
Patricia Seith in 1997, argues that domestic violence is analo- with successful rape and FGM claims, in which the guidance
gous to FGM because both practices attempt to “control [ ] established “a valuable legal framework for asylum claims based
98
women’s sexuality,”94 and that “[w]omen living in a particular on domestic violence.”
Since this assessment was over a decade ago, there are
country who are subject to domestic violence, are unable to get
government protection, and oppose the practice” meet the BIA questions yet to be re-visited about the INS Guidelines. Should
requirements under the seminal decision in Kasigna.95 Another they be codified or at least be required reading for judges? If
they remain nonbinding, is there addiprominent scholar on domestic violence
tional authority that can make them even
asylum, Laura Adams, made an argument
The consistent denial of DV more persuasive? Based on its success,
for a doctrinal re-orientation that takes
two views related to government acqui- claims is not a legal issue—it is can gender-based violence be considered
an independent basis (within PSG) upon
escence. One view is similar to the DHS
a political one.
which future persecution will be deterformulation suggesting that a DV claim
mined? With vast opportunity in a human
itself may implicate a foreign governrights era, thinkers can move away from
ment’s failure to protect its citizen from
persecution.96 Adams takes the position that shifting the focus defending its values to implementing its force.
The political climate toward human rights is ideal for
from the individual batterer to the state’s relationship to the harm
is the necessary ingredient for a successful DV claim.97 It will be engineering fine-tuned legal and policy reform strategies. It is a
interesting to see whether the BIA embraces any of these aspects, matter of catching up U.S. asylum law with its international commitments which is by no means easy, but it is possible given the
as both scholars introduced these ideas at least five years ago.
The fundamental belief that guides the traditional strong framework outlined by scholars and advocates alike. DV
approach is that the current legal PSG construction is based on survivors deserve asylum protection, as do other gender-based
an honest, intellectual disagreement about proper interpretation. violence survivors. Human rights advocates’ chief test is to make
The consistent denial of DV claims is not a legal issue—it is a this area a priority.
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